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NOTRE DAME LAWYER

Intoxication is a term capable of no precise definition, and there may
be many degrees of it. If it exists to such. an extent as to deprive a
testator of the power of controlling his conduct and knowing what he
is about, it will of course have a very evident bearing on his capacity.
But if, on the other hand, the act which he does is one which his intoxication does not prevent him from doing with comprehension, it cannot of itself avoid it. -It must always be remembered that a will isn't
usually entirely or chiefly the result of a single interview when: it is
executed. It has nearly always been planned before and determined
on. It does not require a very high degree of mental capacity to carry
out a deliberate plan before adopted, and it isn't impossible for a person more or less intoxicated to make a will which isn't the product of
intoxication."
To summarize, it is obvious that a lesser degree of mind is required
to execute a will than a contract. However, the testator must understand substantially the nature of his act, the object of his bounty, the
scope of the provisions of his will, the extent of his property, and must
have a sufficiently active memory, to recall without prompting the elements of a business transaction; yet he need not have the same understanding of these matters as a person in sound mind and body would
have. He must have the capacity to know what he is doing, although
it is not necessary that he realize the nature and probable consequences
of his act as required in the making of a contract. A general comprehension of the consequences is sufficient. Ordinarily, a person who is
mentally competent to manage his property and conduct business, will
have sufficient mental capacity to make a will, however an exception
will arisd if the testator has insane delusions or uses intoxicants or
narcotics and is unable to fulfill the requirements set out above.
Edward R. Goggin.

RECENT DECISION
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT DISBARMENT SUIADOWING OF JURORS. Evidence
in the recent disbarment proceeding disclosed that the respondent, during a
criminal case, in which he was counsel, hired one Roth to find out whether the
jurors satisfied requirements as to residence, citizenship, and were otherwise qualified. Roth interviewed the wife of one juror, and the brother of another, and
in some way learned many facts about the others. The respondent was fully
cognizant of all this and approved of it. A criminal action was brought against
Roth and the respondent. Evidence was given that Roth attempted to bribe one
juror by offers to his wife, and another through his brother. Roth was convicted
of the attempted bribery of these two jurors, but the respondent was acquitted
of that charge. There was evidence in this proceeding from which the judge
might have found him guilty, nothwithstanding his acquittal In re Doe, 95 F.
(2d) 386 (1938).

RECENT DECISION
The decision held the respondent's situation to be within the doctrine of Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 749, 49 S. Ct. 471, 73 L. Ed. 938, 63 A. L. R.
1258 (1929); and that he should be subjected to some punishment, but that disbarment was too severe a penalty for shadowing jurors, unless the respondent
meant to "debauch" them. The court said it would affirm the order for disbar*ment if the lower court judge had based his decision upon the ground that the
rmpondent was guilty of attempted bribery of jurors, but remanded the order
since it was possible that the. judge so held because of the doctrine of the "Sinclair Case."
The "Sinclair Case" is finique since it is the only reported case in which a
litigant has been convicted of contempt for employing detectives to shadow jurors.
Thus it might be well to relate the facts of the case and the' doctrine which"
evolved from it. In this case no attorney was involved, the counsel for the defense had no knowledge of the defendant's employment of detectives to shadow
the jurors. The defendant contended that he "feared efforts would be made unlawfully to influence the jury" and since the government in cases which involved
great public interest had "from time to time kept jurors under surveillance during the time of such trials, and, entertaining a belief that the government of the
United States had exercised such right and privilege, he believed that he, as a
citizen of the United States, had the same right and privilege." The court held
that "the employment of detectives by the defendant in a criminal case to shadoW
the jurors amounted to a contempt of court even though none of the persons
engaged in such shadowing approached or communicated with a juror, or attempted to do so, and though no juror may have been conscious of being under
observation.
There are three problems inherent in a discussion of the principal case.. The
first is, did the court, in extending the doctrine of the "Sinclair Case" from the
summary proceedings of contempt to a disbarment case modify and limit its application? Secondly, is shadowing and investigating jurors'by attorneys and their
agents justifiable conduct? Thirdly. is the decision likely to be followed in subsequent proceedings on the subject?
The first question must be answered in the affirmative, because the court said
in In Re Doe that disbarment is too severe a penalty for shadowing jurors, unless
the respondent meant to debauch them. Thus the court felt the intention of the
attorney to influence *the jurors was an essential ingredient in a disbarment case,
whereas, the judges in the "Sinclair Case" held that intention was immaterial.
Such a change in the doctrine appears only natural since contempt does not depind upon the intent of the contemner, but upon his act. Wartman v. Warttnan
(C. C.) Taney, 362, Fed. Case No. 17210 (1852); Kelly v. United States, 250
Fed. 947 (1918). Whereas, in disbarment cases the intention motivating an attorney's act has always been considered of utmost importance. For example, in
Zachary v. State, 53 Fla. 94, 43 So. 925 (1907), the court said, "not only the act
itself charged against an attorney in a proceeding against him for disbarment must
be proved to have been committed, but the bad or fraudulent motive for the commission -thereof must also be established, either from the act itself or from proof
of other circumstances, and, unless this is done, disbarment is not authorized."
The next problem for consideration is that of determining whether the practice
6f investigating and shadowing jurors is justifiable. A study of the process by
which jurors are selected rather forcefully shows that there is little reason for investigating a juror's qualifications as to residence, citizenship and similar points.
Burns Indiana Statute Annotated (1937), § 4-3304, under the heading "Selection
of Name for Jurors" clearly exhibits this fact. The Statute reads, "Said commissioners shall immediately, from the names of the legal voters and citizens of
the United States on the tax duplicate of the county for the current year, proceed
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to select, and deposit in a box to be furnished by the clerk for that purpose, the
names, written on separate slips of paper - of twice as many persons as will be
required. .... In making such selections, they shall in all things, observe their
oath; and they shall not select the name of any person who is not a voter of the
county, or who is not either a freeholder or householder, or who is to them known
to be interested in or has a cause pending which may be tried by jury to be drawn
from the names so selected." (Italics supplied).
This statute, which is representative of the statutes upon the subject,' brings
out the fact that jurors are carefully chosen from a voting list and thus there is
little probability that they are not citizens and residents of the county. It must
also be observed that both attorneys have the right to question jurors under
oath and may reject a certain number without stating their reason or showing
legal cause. And that in criminal cases the jury may be "locked up" for the
duration of the trial. Under such circumstances it is impossible to sanction investigation and shadowing jurors when we consider the relative unimportance of
such an act in comparison with the potential harm it may effect. Their detrimental character is ably brought out by Mr. justice McReynolds when he delivered
the opinion of the court in the "Sinclair Case." He said, "The jury is an essential
instrumentality - an appendage - of the court, and a body ordained to pass
upon the guilt or innocence. Exercise of calm and informal judgment by its
members is essential to proper enforcement of law. The most exemplary resent
having their footsteps dogged by private detectives. All know that men who accept such employment commonly lack fine scruples, often wilfully misrepresent
innocent conduct and manufacture charges. The mere suspicion that he, tis
family, and friends are being subjected to surveillance by such persons is enough
to -destroy the equilibrium of the average juror and render impossible the exercise
of calm judgment upon patient consideration. If those fit for juries understand
that they may be freely subjected to treatment like that here Olisclosed, they will
either shun the burdens of the service or perform it with disquiet and disgust. Trial
by capable juries, in important cases, probably would become an impossibility....
We can discover no reason for emasculating the power of the courts to protect
themselves against this odious thing."
In determining the legality or illegality of the practice it is well to consider
also the Canons of Professional Ethics as formulated by the American Bar Association. Under the heading "Attitude toward jury," the Association says, "All
attempts to curry favors with the juries by fawning, flattery or pretended solicitude for their personal comfort are unprofessional. Suggestions of counsel,
looking to comfort or convenience of jurors, and propositions to dispense with
argument, should be made to the court out of the jury's hearing. A lawyer must
never converse privately with jurors about the case; and both before and during
the trial he should avoid communicating with them, even as to natters foreign
to the cause."
The quotation reveals that the profession believes it unethical for an attorney
to do any act toward the jury which might destroy or lessen the juror's ability
to decide a case honestly and correctly. That shadowing and investigating jurors
will have a detrimental influence upon their work cannot be denied, if any consideration is to be given to the view of the court jn the "Sinclair Case." Thus
it appears almost certain that the profession itself would brand the practice as
unethical.
The instant decision appears to be one which will have support in many jurisdictions because most courts are not prone to disbar attorneys for contempt of
court unless the contempt be so gross in nature as to render the attorney unworthy of his office. Ex Parte v. Robinson, 19 Wall. SOS, 22 L. Ed. 205 (1873).

